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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

vs.

Case No. 990753CA

ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR,
Defendant/ Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because
the sentencing of Mr. Taylor, entered on August 25, 1999 is
considered the final decision of the District Court.
also

See

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2)(e).
The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 31, 1999,

within 3 0 days of the entry of judgment.

Thus, pursuant to

Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this
appeal is timely.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether Trooper Salas exceeded the scope of the

traffic stop by further detaining and questioning the
Defendant Mr. Taylor.
2.

Whether Mr. Taylor's consent to search was invalid

because it was obtained by exploitation of a prior
illegality and was not voluntary.

This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
under a clearly erroneous standard.
910 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1995).

See State v. Troyer.
The legal determinations

regarding reasonable suspicion made by the trial court are
reviewed "for correctness according no deference to the
trial court's conclusions."

State v. Yates. 918 P. 2d 13 6,

138 (Utah 1996); See also. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
A.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .
U.S. Cons t. Amend. IV
B.

UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, sec. 14
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Mr. Taylor appeals from his conviction following the
entry of his conditional plea of guilty to the Information
charging him with Possession of a Controlled Substance
(Marijuana) with Intent to Distribute, a third degree

felony, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 (1998) •
Specifically, Mr. Taylor challenges the Trial court's denial
of his Motion to Suppress Evidence.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1.

On April 12, 1998, Mr. Taylor was charged in an

Information with Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code §58-37-8 (1998) .
2.

Mr. Taylor filed a Motion to Suppress.

A copy of

that motion is attached. (See Addendum A) .
3.

On June 16, 1999, a Suppression Hearing was held.

4.

On July 7, the Motion to Suppress was denied.

A

copy of the Trial Court's Ruling on Motion to Suppress is
attached (See Addendum B) .

On that same day, Mr. Taylor

pled guilty as charged, but preserved his right to appeal
from the Motion to Suppress.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

Mr. Taylor was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a
term of not more than five (5) years on August 25, 1999.
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on August 31, 1999.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 12, 1999, the defendant, Eric Taylor
("Taylor") was traveling on 1-70 in Grand County, Utah.
(Suppression Hearing ["S.H."] 3 ) . He was driving a red 1999
Pontiac Grand Am rental car with a Nevada license plate.
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(S.H. 3 ) . Taylor, a black male born in the U.S. Virgin
Islands, was pulled over by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
Steve Salas ("Trooper Salas") purportedly for having "no
front [license] plate." (S.H. 4, 11).
Trooper Salas approached the vehicle and as the window
was rolled down, he noticed an odor of "perfume or an air
freshener" coming from the vehicle. (S.H. 4) .

Trooper Salas

explained that the stop was because there was no front plate
on the vehicle.

Mr. Taylor then asked to inspect the front

of the vehicle and did so. (S.H. 4) . Mr. Taylor then
returned to the vehicle and Salas asked for his driver's
license, registration, and insurance.

Mr. Taylor provided

these items as well as the rental agreement from the rental
car company. (S.H. 5 ) . Mr. Taylor, a resident of
Massachusetts, had a valid Massachusetts driver's license.
(S.H. 5 ) .
Trooper Salas then proceeded to ask Mr. Taylor what he
was doing in Nevada. (S.H. 5 ) . When Mr. Taylor responded
that he was on business selling computers, Officer Salas
continued the questioning by asking what type of computers
he sold. (S.H. 5 ) . Trooper Salas then returned to his car
and ran driver's license and warrant checks, which came back
clean. (S.H. 5 ) . Trooper Salas wrote Taylor a warning for
having no front license.

(S.H. 5-6).

Trooper Salas continued his questioning.

He asked Mr.

Taylor why the car wasn't in the company name if he was on
business. He asked Mr. Taylor why he didn't fly from
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Massachusetts rather than drive.

He asked Mr. Taylor how

many computers he sold while he was in Las Vegas. (S.H. 6)
Trooper Salas then suggested to Mr. Taylor that someone
had called him and informed him that Mr. Taylor was
transporting drugs. (S.H. 7 ) . Trooper Salas asked for
consent to search the vehicle, which Mr. Taylor granted.
(S.H. 7 ) . While searching in a black bag in the trunk of the
vehicle, Trooper Salas found a package wrapped in gift wrap.
(S.H. 8 ) . Th$ package contained approximately nine pounds of
marijuana.

(S.H. 8 ) .

Mr. Taylor was then taken into custody. (S.H. 9 ) . The
suspected marijuana was logged into evidence and detected in
the state crime lab. (S.H. 9 ) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The tri^.1 court erred in denying Mr. Taylor's Motion to
Suppress because Trooper Salas exceeded the scope of the
stop by relentlessly questioning Mr. Taylor on matters
completely unrelated to the minor traffic violation for
which he was stopped.

Trooper Salas!s questions exceeded

the scope of the traffic stop and were not supported by a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v.
Chapman, 921 p.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995) (stating that once
driver has produced valid driver's license and evidence of
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to
proceed without being subjected to delay by police for
additional questioning) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d
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1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)).

Because Trooper Salas exceeded the

scope of the stop, all evidence obtained from it must be
suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,

488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
While Mr. Taylor eventually consented to the search, he
did so in the course of an illegal seizure.

Therefore, Mr.

Taylor1s consent is invalid and the subsequent search was
illegal.

All evidence obtained from the search must be

suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471,

488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
Mr. Taylor filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence
obtained from the illegal seizure and subsequent search
claiming that Mr. Taylor's rights were violated under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

A

hearing was held and an order entered by the Court on July
7, 1999, which set forth the following:
This Court believes it was reasonable for the
officer to suspect something amiss under these
circumstances [in that the driver was not from
Nevada and had rented the car in Nevada; that the
driver said he sold Microsoft computers, but
Microsoft doesn't make computers; that there were
white velvet bags on the front mirror and the rear
dash; and that there was a strong fragrance of
perfume or air freshener]. Accordingly, the
officer was entitled to delay the driver to ask a
few more questions. The answers to those
questions did not allay the suspicion, but
heightened it slightly. The officer then
appropriately asked for consent to search, which
he received.
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The Court denied Mr. Taylor1s Motion to Suppress the
evidence based upon these findings and it is from this
decision that Mr. Taylor appeals.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TROOPER UNLAWFULLY EXCEEDED THE
SCOPE OF THE STOP

Trooper Salas exceeded the scope of the stop by
questioning Mr. Taylor on matters unrelated to the traffic
violation and unsupported by a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

U.S. Const. Amend IV.

The courts

have held that "although a person has a lesser expectation
of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not
lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an
automobile."

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah

1994) (quoting State v. Schlosser. 774 P.222d 1132, 1135
(Utah 1989)).

The test for whether a search or seizure is

constitutionally reasonable is twofold: (1) was the police
officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) was the
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
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place?

See State v. Shepard. 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct.

App. 1998).
As part of this inquiry, the courts have found that
when an officer stops a vehicle, "the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop."

Id. Also, "once the driver has

produced a valid driver's license and evidence of
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay
by police for additional questioning."

State v. Lopez, 873

P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); See also State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995).
This is precisely what went unconstitutionally wrong in
this case.

Taylor was stopped on a very minor traffic

violation, no front plate. (S.H. 4 ) . He produced a valid
driver's license and a rental agreement showing his
entitlement to the vehicle.

A warrants and license check

came back clean. (S.H. 5 ) . He was given a warning for
having no front plate on his vehicle, the purported purpose
of the stop. (S.H. 5) . At this point, Taylor should have
been allowed to proceed, "without being subjected to further
delay by police for additional questioning."

Lopez at 113 7.

See also State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995)
(stating that upon receiving a negative response to a
warrants check, the officers were required to either arrest
the defendant, issue him a citation, or release him) .
8

However, Taylor was subjected to additional
questioning.

Salas asked additional questions unrelated to

the stop such as why the rental car wasn't in a company
name, and why Taylor drove rather than flew from
Massachusetts. (S.H. 6 ) . The answers Taylor gave to these
questions may have been somewhat inconsistent, however, this
questioning was not constitutionally acceptable in the first
place and should not have even been asked.

Based on these

few questions and inconsistent answers, Trooper Salas asked
Mr. Taylor "if there would be any reason why someone would
call me and inform me that he [Mr. Taylor] was transporting
drugs."

(S.H. 7 ) . Trooper Salas then asked permission to

search the vehicle and the discovery of the drugs ensued.
(S.H. 7)
The State may argue that questions asked by Salas were
proper investigative questions.

However, "further detention

for investigative questioning ^must be supported by
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.1"
State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)).

This suspicion must be "based on specific,

articulable facts drawn from the totality of the
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop."
Id.
The Trial Court agreed that the "conversation after
checking the driver's license was not routine and would be
permitted only if information gathered to that point gave
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rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."
(Ruling on Motion

to Suppress: 1-2). The Trial Court found

that the officer knew four things at this point: 1) that the
driver was not from Nevada and had rented the car in Nevada;
2) the driver said he sold Microsoft computer and Microsoft
does not make computers; 3) there were white bags on the
front mirror and rear dash; and 4) there was a strong
fragrance of perfume or air freshener.

(Ruling on Motion to

Suppress: 2 ) . The Trial Court found that this was enough to
create an objectively reasonable suspicion; Taylor
disagrees.
In State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
the defendants were pulled over for speeding.

They were

unable to produce a registration card or other paperwork to
establish ownership of the car.

A check on the license

plate reported that the plate number was not on file.
Furthermore, the defendant initially gave the officer a
receipt for work done on the car with someone's name on it
other than defendant's.

The officer was given a handwritten

card with only a vehicle identification number on it.

The

officer then wanted to compare the VIN on the card with the
actual VIN in the car.

While doing this, the officer saw,

in plain view, a corncob pipe which smelled of marijuana.
The officer then searched the vehicle and found marijuana
and other drugs.
The court found that the officer's conduct in Shepard
was supported by an

objectively reasonable suspicion.
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The

officer had a reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen
because the defendant produced a repair receipt with someone
else's name on it.

The defendant also produced a suspicious

temporary registration card with only a VIN on it.

This

justified the officer in comparing the VIN on the card with
the VIN in the vehicle.

The officer then saw the corncob

pipe in plain view and smelled marijuana, which justified
his further search of the vehicle.
Officer Salas in the present case had no such
"reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity."
In Shepard, the defendant failed to produce evidence of
entitlement to the car.

Here, Taylor produced a valid

rental agreement proving his entitlement to the car as well
as a valid driver's license.

In Shepard, the officer saw a

corncob pipe which smelled of marijuana.

In this case, the

officer saw no such incriminating evidence.

The fact that

Taylor was not from Nevada and he had rented the vehicle in
Nevada is not suspicious as business and personal travelers
often rent vehicles at their destination.
Salas apparently relied upon the smell of "perfume or
an air freshener" (S.H. 4) to suspect further criminal
activity.

Rental cars often have such a smell as do many

other cars.

Furthermore, in United States v. Gonzalez, 763

F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985), the officer noticed an "extremely
strong odor of some kind of deodorizer." Id. at 1127. The
defendant was pulled over in New Mexico and gave the officer
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a New York driver's license and a California car title
document.

In response to the officer's questions, the

defendant stated he was going to Albuquerque to give the car
to the owner.

The defendant, however, could not give the

name of the car's owner.

In holding that this was an

illegal search and seizure, the court stated that the
officer was "unable to articulate particular facts - other
than the deodorizer smell and the unusual combination of
automobile license, registration, and title documents--"
that would justify a reasonable suspicion to detain and
search defendant's vehicle.

See id. at 1128-29.

Salas also apparently relied on some inconsistent or
"odd" answers Mr. Taylor gave to some of Salas' s questions.
However, in Gonzales, the fact that the defendant gave odd
answers, i.e. did not know the name of the car's owner, did
not justify the officer in searching the vehicle.

Likewise

in this case, Mr. Taylor's responses to Trooper Salas's
questions do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
justifying a search.

This is particularly true in this case

because many of Trooper Salas's questions should not have
even been asked in the first place.
Salas also apparently relied on the pager attached to
Taylor's belt to suspect illegal activity. (S.H. 6 ) .
Trooper Salas also found it important to note that he saw
some small velvet bags on the dash of Mr. Taylor's vehicle
(S.H. 4 ) . These items, in themselves, do not denote
criminal activity.

The case law on point require much more

n

to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
involving contraband.

See State v. Shepard (a corncob pipe

smelling of marijuana justified search); State v. Earl, 716
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (a loaded firearm, a quantity of
controlled substances and drug paraphernalia gave officer
cause to believe additional contraband might be located in
the vehicle).

In the present case, Trooper Salas seemed to

rely on a profile to suspect drug activity: a black male
with an Island accent driving a shiny red new car and
wearing a pager.

Based on this profile, Trooper Salas

followed a hunch, which later turned out to be correct, that
Mr. Taylor was transporting drugs. However, as the Utah
Supreme Court has stated, a hunch, without more, does not
raise a reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the
final result.

See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah

1991) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
After getting Taylor's driver's license and rental
agreement, Salas began questioning Taylor as to what he was
doing in Nevada. (S.H. 5) .

Salas had evidence of Taylor's

right to drive and to possess the vehicle, so his questions
amounted to a fishing expedition based on the smell of an
air freshener, a pager, and perhaps Taylor's race.
questions were inappropriate as

The

"once the driver has

produced a valid driver's license and evidence of
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay
by police for additional questioning."
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State v. Lopez, 873

P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Robinson. 797
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).
The seizure of Mr. Taylor was unreasonable under
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

All

evidence seized as the fruit of the unlawful continued
detention must be suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United

States. 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9L.Ed.2d
441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).

POINT II. MR. TAYLORS CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WAS
INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED AS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL
DETENTION
Mr. Taylor gave his consent to Trooper Salas to search
the vehicle while he was being illegally detained.

To show

the consent was lawfully obtained, the State must show it
was (1) voluntary, and (2) not obtained by exploitation of
the prior illegality.

See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684,

688 (Utah 1990).
In determining whether the evidence was obtained by
exploitation of the prior illegality, the courts look at
whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal seizure.

The factors to be considered in an

exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the
illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.

See id. at 690-91 n.4.

In the present case, the consent was obtained at a time
when the officer should have allowed Mr. Taylor to proceed
on his way without further delay.

At the time Mr. Taylor

consented to the search, the purposes of the stop had been
completed.

Trooper Salas had verified Mr. Taylor's right to

drive and right to possession of the vehicle and had issued
a warning for having no front plate.

(S.H. 5) .

Even though

Trooper Salas had returned Mr. Taylor's license and other
belongings at this point, Mr. Taylor did not reasonably
believe he was free to go.

At no point did Trooper Salas

tell Mr. Taylor that he was free to go.

In fact, Trooper

Salas continued to question Mr. Taylor, and it was during
the course of this detention that Mr. Taylor gave his
consent to search the vehicle.

(S.H. 7 ) .

In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), the defendant was pulled over for drifting between
lanes.

The driver was unable to produce a driver's license

and neither occupant was the registered owner of the
vehicle.

Because the defendant was behaving nervously, the

officer asked him if they had any alcohol, firearms, or
drugs in the vehicle.

Orozco, the driver of the car,

believed that the fact he was Mexican and did not have a
driver's license meant the officer would search the car
whether he granted permission or not.

As a result, Orozco

gave consent for the vehicle to be searched.

In finding the

consent to be the result of an illegal detention, the court
found that the "consent occurred during an ongoing illegal
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seizure, thus no time factor separated the illegality from
the consent." Id.
The present case is similar in that Mr. Taylor, a black
man, was being detained and questioned by Trooper Salas.
Trooper Salas claims to have returned Mr. Taylor's documents
to him before the consent to search was given.

Even if he

actually did return them, Mr. Taylor was never told he was
free to go and never reasonably believed he could go. (S.H.
6-7). The detention continued, and this is when the consent
was given.
Mr. Taylor's consent was invalid under Article 1,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Accordingly,

evidence seized as the fruit of the invalid consent and
unlawful continued detention must be suppressed.

Wong Sun

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18,
9L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786
(Utah 1991).
CONCLUSION
While Taylor's answers to some of Salas's questions may
have been strange or inconsistent, Taylor should not have
even been asked these questions in the first place.

Even if

Trooper Salas was justified in asking these questions, the
answers did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of
further drug activity.

The original purpose of the stop,

the lack of a front license plate, could have been quickly
determined and resolved without such questioning.
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However,

Trooper Salas continued with his questioning, even after the
purpose of the stop was completed.

Furthermore, because Mr.

Taylor was unlawfully detained when he consented to a search
of his vehicle, his consent is invalid.
Based on the foregoing, Taylor respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the Trial Court's ruling denying the
Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 14th day of December, 1999.

(f/AHappy<f\ Morgan
Grand County Public Defender
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of December,
1999, I sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the above BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following:
Office of the Attorney General, Appellate Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Law Office of Happy Morgan
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Addendum ~A~

Happy Morgan, #7586
Attorney at Law
8 S. 100 E.
Moab,UT 84532
(435)259*9418
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
REQUEST FOR HEARING

vs.

Eric Samuel Taylor,
Defendant.

CASE NO. 9917-34

COMES NOW the Defendant hereto by and through his attorney of record, Happy
Morgan, and herewith moves this Court for an Order suppressing any evidence obtained
in violation of hisrightsunder the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ve

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Case No.

ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
Defendant.

9917-34

Judge Lyle R, Anderson

The critical question in this case is whether the police
officer violated defendants' rights by inquiring about
defendant's travel plans.

There is case authority supporting the

proposition that the police may not expand the scope of a stop
without reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity.

It

also seems tc be accepted in otner cases that the police do not
violate an individuals rights by engaging in routine
conversation.
From the evidence presented in this case, it appears that
the officer gained some information before checking che drivers
license.

This information was gained in the course of routine

friendly conversation between the driver and the officer, which
the law does not prohibit.

The conversation after checking the

1

THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
CASE NUMBER 9917-34
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

driver's license was not routine and would be permitted only if
information gathered to that point gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
1.

At that point, the officer knew:

The driver was not from Nevada and had rented the car
in Nevada,

2.

The driver said he sold Microsoft computers.

Microsoft

does not manufacture computers
3.

There were white velvet bags on the frcnc mirror and
the rear dash,

4.

There was a strong fragrance of perfume or air
freshener.

This court believes it was reasonable to suspect something
amiss under these circumstances

Accordingly, the officer was

entitled to delay the driver tc ask a few more questions

The

answers to those questions did not allay the suspicion, but

1

Someone who actually sells computers could possibly answer this question in this
way, meaning "computers that run on Microsoft software, as opposed to Apple." However,
most salesmen would either name their manufacturer or say "TBM compatible".
2

THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
CASE NUMBER 9917-34
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

heightened i t s l i g h t l y .

The o f f i c e r then a p p r o p r i a t e l y asked for

c o n s e n t t o s e a r c h , which he r e c e i v e d .
The motion t o s u p p r e s s i s d e n i e d .

3

THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
CASE NUMBER 9917-34
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

COCTRT CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OP MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on tne

day of July, 1999, I

mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS tc the
following:
Happy Morgan
Public Defender
8 South 100 East
Moab, Uti

William L. Benge
County Attorney
125 East Center
Moab, Utah 6453 2
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1
2

came into contact with the gift I noticed that it was-Q

A gift, what do you mean?

A

Well, it was packaged, it was in gift wrap at the

3
4
bottom of the bag.
5

have square corners.

I pulled it out.
It was firm.

I wasn't--it didn't
It wasn't solid.

6

pulled it out.

7

gift for his wife or for his girlfriend, he said.

8

that time I asked him if I could open it.

9

ahead.

10

I asked him what it was.

I

He said it was a
And at

He said to go

I opened it up and it was packaged narcotics.

Q

Or what appeared to you--

A

Would appear, right?

Q

What kind did it appear to be?

A

At the time I couldn't tell.

11
12
13
14

really thick.
any color.

The packaging was

They were in square packages.

I couldn't see

After I had taken the packages out of the bag

15

and put them on my vehicle I put Mr. Taylor in handcuffs and

16

he told me it was marijuana.

17 I

Q

Okay.

18

A

I think it was a little over nine pounds.

Q

How many separate packages?

A

Three separate packages.

Q

Did you weigh it yourself to determine the nine

19

How much marijuana did you ultimately find?

20
21
pounds?
22
23

A

No I did not.

During the, after I had Mr. Taylor

handcuffed he explained to me that it was nine pounds.

He

24

said, because I had searched the vehicle after finding those

25

three packages he said, "That is all there is.

There's only

Addendum ~C
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Eric Samuel Taylor, c?se 991700034.

MR. BENGE:

We're ready, Your Hon<:>r.

THE COURT:

Go ahead.
STEVE SALAS,

6 II

having first been duly and legally sworn, was

7 II

examined and testified on his oath as follows:

8

ii

9 I

DIRECT EXAMINATION
py MR. BENGE:

10

Q

Tell us your name, please.

11

A

Steve Salas.

12

Q

How are you employed?

A

Utah Highway Patrol.

Q

How long have you been employed there?

2*.

Yz. \»ill be Si y&dcz ii\ S-aly .

Q

Let me call your attention to the 12th of April of

13
14
15
16

tftis year.

Were you on duty?

17

A

Yes, I was.

18 II

Q

And on that day did you have an occasion to have

19 ||
20
21

contact with the defendant, Mr. Taylor?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What were the circumstances?

A

I stopped Mr. Taylor on 1-70, approximately at mile

22
post 166.

I came into contact with him on a traffic stop.

23
24
25

Q

What was he driving?

A

He was in a red Pontiac Grand Am, '99.

Q,

And did you notice anything out of the ordinary
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1
about the vehicle?

2

A

The reason for the stop was no front plate.

I

3
noticed he had Nevada plates.

The rear plate was a Nevada

4
plate.
5

He didn't have a front plate on the vehicle.

That was

the reason for the stop.

^

Q

7

In your experience as a highway patrolman in an

adjacent state, are you aware Nevada requires a front plate?

8

A

Yes, they do.

n

Q

After stopping him, what happened?

A

I approached the vehicle.

10

And as I was approaching

the vehicle I noticed Mr. Taylor had like a white, probably a
11
like a velvet bag on the bag dash.

I came into contact with

12
him.
13

I noticed there was another one hanging from the front

mirror.

14
15

16

Q

How big were these velvet bags?

A

They were probably two inch by two inch.

They were

fairly small.

17 I
18

Q

Okay.

A

Right.

Like a sachet kind of a thing?
As he rolled down the window I noticed a

fragrance, strong odor coming from the vehicle, like a

19

perfume or an air freshener, something of that sort.

I

20
explained the reason I stopped Mr. Taylor, it was for the
21
front plate.
22

vehicle and see the front plate.

23
24

25

He immediately wanted to get out of the

that.
II

So he was welcomed to do

We got out, looked at the front plate.

He had

explained to me that it may have fallen off or somebody may
have stolen the plate.
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1
2

Q

What happened next?

A

At that point he got back in the vehicle.

I asked

3
him to get back in the vehicle.

I asked him for his

4
driver's license, registration, and insurance.
5

I noticed

his driver's license was from Massachusetts so I asked him

6

if he had purchased the vehicle in Nevada.

V

me that he had rented the vehicle so I got his rental

8

agreement from him, looked at it, all his documentation.

g

asked him a few questions, asked him what he was doing in
Nevada.

He explained to

I

He explained to me that he was there on business.

10
I asked him what kind of business he was in.

He told me he

11
was in computer sales.
12

I asked him what kind of computers

did he sell and he told me Microsoft and stuff like that.

13

I

asked him a few other questions.

14

Q

Did the answer, Microsoft, to your question,

-^

wasn't that what brand of computers do you sell, strike you

16

as odd?

17 I

A

When that was his response that struck me kind of

funny since Microsoft isn't a computer, it's a software.

18

had to ask people that question before and they're detailed

19

in the type of computers that they sell.

They usually know

20
what they sell.
21
22
23
24

25

I

Q

What happened next?

A

At that point I went back to my vehicle.

I ran

his driver's license and warrant checks through Price
II

dispatch.
plate.

I wrote him out a warning for no front license

Nothing came back as far as warrants go.

I went
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1
back to the vehicle.

2

I gave Mr. Taylor all his stuff back.

I proceeded to ask him the same questions.

I asked him

3
where he stayed in Nevada and he gave me the same location.
4
While I was in my vehicle I noticed that the rental car was
5

in his name.

°

It wasn't in a company name, which was kind of

odd since it was a business trip.

7

I questioned him about that, asked him why it

8

wasn't in the company name.

He explained to me that it was,

9

that he was going to purchase the vehicle, or rent the
vehicle, and they were going to reimburse him when he got

10

back.

I asked him why he didn't fly down to Las Vegas from

11
Massachusetts because of the distance and he explained to me
12
that he liked to sightsee, which was kind of odd due to the
13

fact that it was a business trip.

14

I also asked him again, I asked him how many

15

computers he did sell while he was in Las Vegas.

16

explained to me that he didn't sell any computers.

17 I

the comment that that was a waste of a trip and he says,

18

"Well, actually I was just there for a conference", which

He
I made

was becoming a little inconsistent from what I'd heard

19

before.
20
Q

Did you notice at any time in your dealing with

21
him if he had any electronic equipment on his person?
22

A

23
24

25

Yes, as he got out to examine the front plate I

noticed that he did have a pager attached to his belt.
II

Q

What else then happened?

A

After asking him several questions about his trip
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1
2

I asked him how he got down through Las Vegas.

He explained

to me that he had rented a separate rental car as he went
3
down to Las Vegas.

I asked him why he didn' t keep the

4
vehicle or why he wasn't in the same vehicle.
5

He explained

to me that once he arrived in Las Vegas he pretty much

6

traveled by public transportation and by foot.

7

point I had asked him, after asking him those questions I

8

asked him, and I'm going to refer to my report here, I asked

g

him if there would be any reason why someone would call me

10

and inform me that he was transporting drugs.

At that

And he got a

surprised look on his face and just said no repeatedly,
11 >l
shaking his head.
12
13
14

Q

What happened next?

A

At that time I asked for a consent to search.

granted me permission to search the vehicle.

He

I pulled him

15

out of the vehicle, got him in front of the vehicle,

16

searched him.

17 I

see if he had any weapons on him, put him about probably 15

18

feet up in front of the vehicle where I could see him.

19

He had a--I searched him for weapons just to

I

immediately went to the trunk of the vehicle, pulled, he had
luggage, just a few bags, I believe a blanket and a pillow

20
in the back, pulled them out.
21
In a large black bag, as I was searching, and I
22

noticed he had Levis and a jersey t-shirt.

He didn't have

23

any business clothes, (inaudible) he was wearing a tie.

24

that black bag that I was searching, I dug up under the

25

clothes and found a large package that was a gift.

In

When I
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1
nine pounds."

2

Q

Did you have any further conversations with Mr.

3
Taylor about this incident other than him telling you that
4
it was marijuana and that it was only nine pounds?
5

A

After we had taken him into custody we took him

°

back to the office and we questioned him and we asked him a

7

few questions, where he had bought it, who it was for.

8 I

Q

Had you mirandized him at that point?

9

A

Yes, we had.

Q

Who all was present?

10

A ~ Myself and Sergeant Mecham, Darrell Mecham.
11
Q

What was the nature of that conversation?

A

He explained to us that it. was personal use.

12
13

wasn't for distribution.

14
1

It wasn't going anywhere.

It

He said

he just enjoyed smoking marijuana.

^

Q

16

Did he indicate--you said you asked him where he

got it.

17 I

A

He told us that he did buy it in California.

asked him to name, who he had bought it from.

18

We

He said he

just went down there, went out on the street and found

19

somebody, found a buyer.
20
Q

What did you do with the suspected marijuana?

A

We logged it into evidence in our office.

21
22

later detected in the state crime lab in Price.

23
24

25

It was

II

Q

Who took it up there or how did it get up there?

A

I took it myself.

Q

Did you get a report back from the crime lab?
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1
2

A

Yes, I did.

Q

I'll show you what's been marked as State's

3
Exhibit No. 1.
4

Is that the report that you received back

from the crime lab?

5
^

A

Yes, it is.

Q

Is there some way that you can tie that in to the

7

packages that you took from this defendant by case number or

8

name or anything?
A

9

I could take it in by case number, also by

description, description of the three plastic wrapped

10

bundles.
11

MS. MORGAN:

No objection.

12
13

Exhibit 1 is received.

MR. BENGE:

No, Your Honor.

Is that all,

Mr. Benge?

14
15

THE STATE:

II

16
17
-jo
19

Q

BY MR. BENGE:

Have you had any training and

experience in drug interdictions?
A

I've had classes, yes.

I've taken two separate

schools for drug interdictions.
Q

Based upon your training in drug interdiction does

that quantity of that particular controlled substance
20
indicate to you, independent of the defendant's own
21
statements, whether or not it's for sole use or for
22
23
24 ||
25

distribution?
A

In my experience it would be for distribution.
MR. BENGE:

That's all I h a v e .

• 11
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MS. MORGAN;
Q

In what direction were you traveling when you

first saw Mr. Taylor's automobile?
A

I was sitting as milepost 162 and he was traveling

eastbound.
Q

So he was driving towards you?

A

Right, he drove towards me and went by me.

Q

And so when you first looked at the vehicle you

noted at that point that it didn't have front plates?
A

Right.

Q

As part of your training have you been instructed

that rental cars are more likely than other cars to be
transporting drugs?
A

Not necessarily, no.

Q

So you don't have any specific, or any tendency to

pull over a rental car rather than another car (inaudible)?
A

No, I wasn't even aware it was a rental car until

the stop.
Q

And the fact that this was a new automobile, did

that impact your decision in any way to pull it over that
day?
A

No.

Q

Now, Mr. Taylor is black and I don't believe he's

African American, I think he's Jamaican.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
MS. MORGAN:

Pardon me?

Did that--

(Inaudible).
Virgin Islands.

He was
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1
from the Virgin Islands.

2

Q

BY MS. MORGAN:

But to me he appears black.
The fact that he has black skin,

3
did that in any way lead you to believe that he was possibly
4
transporting drugs in his car that day?
5
6

A

No.

Q

And how about the fact that he has sort of a

7

Jamaican West Indies accent?

8 I

to believe that he was transporting drugs that day?

9
10

Did that in any way lead you

A

No, it did not.

Q

And the pager that you mentioned in your police

report.

I'm somewhat curious why that was noteworthy in

11
your report.
12
A
13

That's just a minor indicator.

I mean, pagers are

used by everybody but also cell phones, pagers, some type of

14

communication to seek your contact where you're coming and

15

going.

16 II
17 II

Q

they're not all necessarily-A

18

In your experience lots of people wear pagers and

Right.
MS. MORGAN:

19

I have no further questions for this

witness, Your Honor.
20
THE COURT:

Mr. Benge?

MR. BENGE:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BENGE:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ms. Morgan?

21
22
23
24

25

II

MS. MORGAN:

You can step down.

Your Honor, I'm not sure if we're
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1

going forward right now on the preliminary hearing and the

2

Motion to Suppress or if you're just seeking argument on
3
whether or not a bind over is appropriate.
4
THE COURT:
5
6

Just the bind over.

MS. MORGAN:
II

THE COURT:

Nothing then.
From the evidence that has been

7

presented here I find that there is probable cause to

8

believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in

9

the information and I order that he be held to answer to
that charge in the district court.

10

If he wants to take care

of the plea right now then we can move ahead to the
11
suppression question.
12
MS. MORGAN:
13

THE COURT:

14
15

We would like to, Your Honor.
All right.

Do you waive the reading

of the information?
II

16

MS. MORGAN:
THE COURT:

We do, Your Honor.
Come forward, Mr. Tanner.

Mr. Tanner,

17 H

you're charged in this information with the offense of

18

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third
degree felony.

19

How do you plead to that charge?

MR. TAYLOR:

Not guilty.

20
THE COURT:

The defendant pleads not guilty.

That

21
plea will be entered.
22

the Motion to Suppress.

23
24

25

Before I set a trial date I'll decide

MS. MORGAN:
I

THE COURT:

Thank you.
All right, do you wish to present

additional evidence on the question of suppression, Mr.
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1
Benge?

2

MR. BENGE:

No, Your Honor, it was my

3
understanding we were going to use one hearing for both.
4
THE COURT:
5
6

Okay, any additional evidence, Ms.

Morgan?
II

7

MS. MORGAN:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Okay, you have filed a Motion to

8

Suppress which is now appropriate and will be considered.

g

Tell me why I should suppress the evidence based on the

10

evidence that I've heard today.
MS. MORGAN:

We don't believe that the stopping of

11
the vehicle was reasonable, however, when the officer began
12
asking about his trip, where he was going and why he was
13
14

going there, why he chose this mode of transportation, what
he did for a living, that went beyond the scope of the

15

initial traffic search.

16

that the Court suppress the evidence.

17 I
18
19

And because of that we're asking

And I understand that the officer has testified
that Mr. Taylor consented to search of the vehicle.

And it

would be our position that given the circumstances and what
the officer knew at that time he had no reasonable

20
articulable suspicion to even ask that question and so he
21
should not have asked that question.
22
23

Mr. Taylor should not

have been in the position of having to answer that question.
So based on the officer going beyond the scope of the

24

original traffic search and asking to search the vehicle

25

when he didn't have a reasonable basis we're asking that the
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1

Court suppress the evidence found in the vehicle that day.

2

And all of Mr. Taylor's statements regarding that evidence.
3
THE COURT:

Okay, Mr. Benge?

MR. BENGE:

Your Honor, I believe that Counsel is

4
5

correct in your statement that the standard is articulatable

6

suspicion.

7

original traffic stop, does have to have some articulatable

8

suspicion.

9

that must be or that that may be ascertained from the

The officer, in order to detain beyond the

And in fact it is, the Courts have held that

totality of the circumstances not from any one thing, but a

10

totality of things.
11
In this case we have this gentleman who was
12
wearing a pager, even though the officer truthfully
13

indicates a lot of people do, he indicates that is an item

14

that he looks at.

He talked to this person, the individual,

15

about his business.

16

When asked what kind he said Microsoft.

17

him, was an odd thing with Microsoft being software not a

-jo

computer.
Vegas.

19

The person said he sold computers.
Which again, to

He asked him about why he didn't fly to Las

He stated that he liked to drive and see the country

but didn't give a very good explanation of why he would have
20
rented one car and drive from Massachusetts to Las Vegas one
21
way and then rent another car to drive from Las Vegas back
22

to Massachusetts.

23
24

25

The same thing with the rental car not being in
II

his company's name.

All of those items, Your Honor, add up

to not necessarily a probable cause but this isn't a
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1
probable cause hearing.

2

They add up to an articulatable

suspicion on this officer's part not to search but to ask if
3
he could search.

And he did ask.

He was granted consent.

4
And this minor intrusion was justified based on the
5

articulatable suspicion to get to the point of the asking

6

for permission which was granted and he searched.

7

would submit it on that basis.

8

THE COURT:

g

And we

Mr. Benge, what's the, where does the

officer get the right to ask the questions in the first
place about where he's going, what he's doing?

10

MR. BENGE:

I think he's allowed to make

11
conversation, and at first just to make conversation, and
12
then when he gets an accurate response I think he can go
13

further into it.

14

MS. MORGAN:

And, Your Honor, I guess I would

15

disagree with that.

16

in hand and I think that the totality of the circumstances--

17 I

I think that the officer had a hunch and obviously it was a

18

good hunch but a hunch isn't good enough.

I think he had Mr. Taylor's paperwork

I mean, we've got

a black man in a red car, brand new car, with a West Indies

19

accent.

And I guess it's our position that that's what lead

20
to this line of questioning in the first place.

And that's

21
what made his story about computers less plausible than
22

maybe someone else's story.

23
24

25

That he went beyond the scope

when he started asking those questions.
II

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BENGE:

And I guess I certainly, I don't want
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1
2

to play a race card or even respond to a race card being
played but were this a white person in an old white car

3
would this thing be any different if the same totality of
4
circumstances exited, and therefore, the same articulatable
5

suspicion?

6

And we would submit it.
MS. MORGAN:

Well, Your Honor, I apologize if it

7 II

appears that I!ve been attempting to play the race card

8

here.

9 I

is often an issue and it's often discussed and that's why I

10

But in profile stops in search and seizure law race

just wanted to make clear that it was our position that that
was a definite possible factor in this matter.

11
MR. BENGE:

The evidence indicates otherwise, Your

THE COURT:

Well, I think this case turns for me

12
Honor.
13
14

on the question of whether the officer can legitimately

15

start asking these questions.

16

these answers do, they are strange enough, and I think maybe

17

strange is the only word I can use.

18

think reasonably suspect this guy is doing something else

19

Because I think if he could

That you wonder, I

other than what he says he is and he's hiding it and it's
probably something illegal.

At least enough suspicion

20
reasonably to ask.
21
And the question I'm struggling with is whether
22
23

they can actually ask the questions in the first place.

And

I don't know that I've ever settled down in what I think

24

about that and I don't know of any appellate opinions that

25

give me much guidance on that subject.

Are either of you
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1
2

aware of any before we address that?
MR. BENGE:

I can't quote cases on it, Your Honor,

3
but I guess I'd argue that an officer, I think he can ask
4
anything.
5

Now if the person doesn't want to answer, that's

I guess their business too.

But I think, I don't think that

6

there's a Court is telling an officer what he can talk to a

7

person that he stops out on the interstate about.

8
9

10

THE COURT:

Well, they have said you can't ask for

consent to search until you get reasonable suspicion.
can't expand the stop.
expand the scope.

You

And they've also said you can't

And yet I think it's also, I'm having

11
trouble with a notion that an officer can't make friendly
12
conversation with a passenger that he's stopped, with a
13
14

driver that he's stopped, either.
I really haven't heard evidence on whether the

15

length of the stop was expanded by the conversation, neither

16

of you really addressed that.

17 I

factor that I need to decide as well.

18

better read the cases again.

19

And maybe that's the critical
Well, I think I'd

Either of you have any cases

you want to suggest to me that I need to read or just
general principles that you've argued?

20
MR. BENGE:

I don't have anything right in front

21
of me, Your Honor.
22
23
24
25

I might find something by the end of the

week. I don't know, what is your timeframe?
THE COURT:

Well, if I don't decide today it will

be next Thursday before I get to it.
MS. MORGAN:

I think that there's a State vs

•19-

1
Chapman that addresses scope in general, but it f s my

2

recollection that there have only been one or two Utah cases
3
since then and they don't answer this question.

And so I

4
don't think that you will find a definitive answer and if
5

you do it's something I missed because I did look so I think

6

you're going to be put in a position of having to wing it.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, let me think about it a

8

little more before I wing it then.

9

decision within two weeks.

And I'll get you a

Why don't we just schedule Mr.

Taylor for an appearance before the Court on the 3 0th to

10

hear my decision if it hasn't been rendered before then and
11
to schedule a trial date if I've denied the motion.

If I

12
grant the motion I suppose I can go ahead and grant a motion
13

to dismiss at the same time because you don't have a viable

14
15

case without the evidence.
II

MR. BENGE:

16

MS. MORGAN:

Correct.

Thank you.

Well, Your Honor, on the 30th I won't

17

be available but if you would intend to dismiss the case

18

maybe you would want Mr. Taylor to wait while I'm on
vacation.

19

And so-THE COURT:

I'll make a decision by the 30th one

20
way or another without you needing to be here.

If I deny it

21
we'll have it.
22

but I promise you, Mr. Taylor, I'll make a decision before

23
24

25

Let's put it on the calendar for July 7th

the 30th.
I

MS. MORGAN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings concluded)
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